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Abstract
The most fundamental issues in labor and employment law involve the choice among three
alternatives: waivable employers’ rights, waivable employees’ rights, and nonwaivable
employees’ rights. By combining standard contract analysis with a perspective informed by
behavioral economics, it is possible to obtain a much better understanding of the underlying
issues. Contrary to the conventional view: workers are especially averse to losses, and not so
much concerned with obtaining gains; workers often do not know about legal rules, including
key rules denying them rights; workers may well suffer from excessive optimism; workers care a
great deal about fairness, and are willing to punish employers who have treated them unfairly,
even at workers’ own expense; many workers greatly discount the future; and workers often care
about relative economic position, not absolute economic position. These points suggest the
advantages, in many cases, of relying on waivable employees’ rights, an approach designed to
inform workers without providing the rigidity and inefficiency associated with nonwaivable
terms. At the same time, these points suggest, though more ambiguously, the hazards of allowing
workers to waive their rights in accordance with standard contract principles. Procedural
constraints (e.g., cooling off periods) and substantive constraints (e.g., “floors”) on waiver may
be appropriate. Norm change and preference change are also discussed. Applications include
job security; parental leave; vacation time; health care; unionization; occupational safety and
health; discrimination on the basis of age, race, and sex; waivers by unions; and workers’
compensation. The basic conclusion is that waivable employees’ rights are a promising and
insufficiently explored option in many areas of labor and employment law.
I. Introduction
A. A Problem and A Proposal
In allocating rights in the workplace, the law has many options. It might, for example,
confer certain rights on employers, but allow employees to purchase those rights (to, say, health
care or vacation time) through a voluntary trade. It might make certain employers’ rights
nonwaivable; it might say, for example, that an employee, or a group of employees, cannot buy
an employer’s right to donate money to political campaigns. It might give employees certain
waivable rights, saying, for example, that an employee is presumed to have a right to at least four
weeks of vacation each year, but that employers can buy that right through a suitable deal. Or it
might give employees rights that cannot be waived, saying, for example, that no worker may be
asked to trade the right to four weeks of vacation each year. There are many possible variations.
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The basic purpose of this Article is bring a better understanding of human behavior, with
the assistance of cognitive psychology and behavioral economics,1 to bear on the most basic
questions in employment law. 2 I offer two general claims. The first is that waivable workers’
rights represent a desirable approach for the future, partly because waivable rights lack the
rigidity of nonwaivable ones, and partly because they ensure that the key information will be
provided to workers. The second claim is that traditional approaches to employment law make
many blunders, because they are based on an inadequate sense of workers’ actual values and
behavior. Contrary to the conventional wisdom: workers are especially averse to losses, and not
so much concerned with obtaining gains; workers often do not know about legal rules, including
key rules denying them rights; workers are likely to suffer from excessive optimism; workers
care a great deal about fairness, and are willing to punish employers who have treated them
unfairly, even at workers’ own expense3; many workers greatly discount the future; and workers
often care about relative economic position, not absolute economic position. In short, workers
are like most people. They behave like homo sapiens, not like homo economicus.4
More specifically, I attempt to see how a more realistic understanding of workers’
thoughts and actions, alongside suitably modified contractual principles, would help us to sort
out the relevant inquiries in the choice among the four principal approaches to the law of labormanagement relations: (1) waivable employers’ rights, (2) waivable workers’ rights, (3)
nonwaivable workers’ rights, and (4) waivable workers’ rights with constraints on permissible
waiver. I suggest that in many situations, the law should confer certain entitlements on
employees rather than employers, but allow those entitlements to be waived, either at a market
price (an “unconstrained waiver”) or subject to governmentally determined floors, whether
procedural or substantive (a “constrained waiver”). The principal purpose of this approach is to
ensure that employers fully disclose contractual terms to employees, and allow employees to
waive only when waiver is thought to be worthwhile, without producing the rigidity and
inefficiency, and potential harm to workers and consumers alike, that are created by systems of
nonwaivable, “one-size-fits-all” terms.5
The basic idea could be applied to both unionized and non-unionized workplaces. It could
even be applied to the question whether workers are collectively organized at all; a default rule
might specify collective organization, and allow workers to opt out, rather than specifying the
opposite, and allowing them to opt in.6 It is especially important to see that the default rule
matters. What I will ultimately suggest is a kind of two-tiered system of employment law,
involving (a) nonwaivable statutory minima, below which no workplace may go, and (b)

1

See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1991); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Behavioral Law and Economics (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
2
I use this term to refer to both “labor law,” traditionally taken to refer to the law relating to unions and
unionization, and “employment law,” traditionally taken to refer to the law relating to statutory protections of
workers.
3
This is the basic theme of Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don’t Fall During A Recession (2000).
4
See Richard Thaler, From Homo Economicus to Homo Sapiens, J Ec Persp (2000).
5
A system of nonwaivable terms is urged in Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations, 51
U Chi L Rev 1012 (1984); my criticisms of the more ad hoc system of modern statutory law would apply to Fried’s
general proposal as well.
6
See Paul Weiler, Governing the Workplace (1993).
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waivable workers’ rights, involving an ample set of safeguards that employers may “buy” for a
mutually agreeable fee.7 The real questions should involve the content of the two categories.
B. An Unduly Limited Debate
In the workplace, as elsewhere, the law cannot “do nothing.”8 For even the most
enthusiastic believers in private property and freedom of contract, it is necessary to start
somewhere, not with “nature” or voluntary arrangements but with an initial allocation of legal
rights.
Most debates in American employment law have been framed narrowly and in terms of
the three alternatives of waivable employers’ rights, collective bargaining, and nonwaivable
workers’ rights. Under a system of waivable employers’ rights, the law confers an initial
entitlement on employers, but employees can “buy” the relevant right if they have both the desire
and the leverage to do so. It is important to emphasize that the employer has these rights not by
nature, and not as a result of anything consensual, but because of a distinctly legal decision, to
confer the relevant rights on the employer rather than the employee. The right at issue might
involve the most fundamental questions for workers: job security, workplace safety, pensions,
health insurance, leave policy, vacation time, freedom from race, sex and age discrimination, and
so forth.
This simple idea captures much of the common law of labor relations.9 The common law
confers a wide range of entitlements on employers, subject to individual bargaining. The single
exception is the labor power of the employee.10 Of course, the law grants employees, not
employers, the right to the employee’s time and labor. (Slavery is an obvious qualification.) This
is a right that employees can and do trade for money and other benefits of employment. The
flexibility of the common law approach is its great advantage. But it is not clear that most
workers have the information that would equip them to engage in appropriate bargaining, and it
is possible to think that many individual employees, bargaining with employers, will lack the
knowledge or the power to produce efficient or fair deals without some form of collective
organization. In any case the allocation of initial rights to employers remains to be defended.
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For a brief suggestion along the same lines for worker safety, see Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and
Economics, 98 Yale LJ 341, 358-60 (1988).
8
See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1090 (1972).
9
Described and defended in Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, 92 Yale LJ 1357 (1983).
What Epstein does not sufficiently acknowledge is the extent to which a number of rights are conferred on the
employer by the common law; any suggestion that the common law reflects “laissez faire,” or promotes “voluntary
interactions,” should be prefaced with this point. See in this vein Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in
Work Relations, 51 U Chi L Rev 1012, 1016 (1984): “Only by assuming that the preexisting common law system of
property rights as some natural, preconventional status can the expropriatory thrust of the Wagner Act (to the extent
that there is one) be criticized.” A better way to put it would be to suggest that the very claim that there is an
exproprietary thrust in the Wagner Act depends on the (implausible) claim that the common law system of property
rights has some natural, preconventional status.
10
Note the contrast with a system of slavery, in which the law confers on employers a right to employee labor. The
employers’ right is waivable in the sense that the employer can pay the slave a salary or even giant the slave
freedom, perhaps in return for consideration.
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In the 1930s, the United States ventured a second approach to labor-management
relations. This approach, embodied in the National Labor Relations Act11 (NLRA), was a
dramatic, even revolutionary step: a mechanism for solution of disagreements via collective
bargaining. On this view, entitlements would generally begin in the same place where the
common law put them, with employers. But workers would be allowed, even encouraged to
organize as a group, and workplace management would be decided via a process of bargaining
between employers and employees, thus organized. In some ways, the NLRA’s arrangement is
more complicated and more interesting. With respect to “mandatory” subjects of bargaining –
wages, hours, and working conditions – the NLRA can be understood to remove common law
rights from employers and to create “bargaining entitlements,” that is, entitlements that are not
owned by anyone in particular but that will be a product of bargaining, having been selfconsciously placed, as an initial step, in the hands of neither side.12
This system of worker organization and collective rather than individual bargaining has
been justified on many diverse grounds.13 Most obviously, collective bargaining would allow
information to be shared and pooled among workers, and hence it would permit them to
overcome the many evident barriers to informed bargaining. At the same time, union
representation would resolve a collective action problem faced by individual workers, who
would compete, perhaps to their collective detriment, in the process of seeking employment.14
Self-organization could create a kind of workers’ cartel, justified on the ground that the result
would be to extract better deals from employers (possibly at the expense of nonunionized
workers).15 In any case many of the goods provided by employers – safety, decent lighting, heat,
pension benefits, formal procedures in the event of arbitrary discharge – are “local public goods”
in the sense that they cannot be provided by one without being simultaneously provided to all or
most. In these circumstances a collective voice might ensure against the underproduction of such
goods.16 Perhaps union representation would also respond to short-sightedness, or bounded
rationality, on the part of individual workers, producing outcomes that would best serve their
long-term interests.17 Perhaps collective organization was simply necessary to produce industrial
peace. Whatever its goals, the collective bargaining approach has fallen on hard times with the
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29 USC 151 et seq.
See Michael Wachter and George Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining, 136 U Pa L Rev
1349, 1371-74 (1988).
13
The literature is immense. For summaries, see Richard Freeman and James Medoff, What Do Unions Do? ch. 1
(1984); Michael Harper and Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law 2-4 (1995).
14
For an early statement, see John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy 351(Jonathan Riley ed. 1994) ; see
also Richard Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U Chi L Rev 988 (1984); Richard Freeman and James
Medoff, What Do Unions Do? 6-7 (1984).
15
The “union wage premium” is generally estimated at 10% to 20%, see Harper and Estreicher, supra note, at 14;
Freeman and Medoff, supra, at 43-60. Unions also produce a mix in the compensation package, with particularly
favorable effects on fringe benefits, see id. at 61-77. Thus unionized “establishments are especially likely to allot
funds to deferred forms of compensation favoring senior workers, such as pensions, insurance, and vacation pay,
and to have a large impact on smaller establishments.” Id.at 77.
16
Id. at 8-9.
17
For relevant evidence, see Freedman and Medoff, What Do Unions Do? (1984) (emphasizing distinct features to
compensation packages favored by unions, placing emphasis on long-term problems).
12

4

dramatic decline of union representation since the 1940s, a decline that obviously has something
to do with workers’ uncertainty about whether unionization would help or hurt them.18
The third approach involves nonwaivable employees’ rights. Under this system, the law
confers the relevant right on employees, and employers and employees are forbidden from
contracting around the legal guarantee. The relevant right might be a right to protection from
occupational risks; it might be a right to be free from discharge on grounds of race, sex, or age; it
might be a right not to be discharged for engaging in collective bargaining or for refusing to
violate the law on the employers’ behalf. As a matter of history, the third approach seems largely
a reaction to the first, fueled by complaints about employers’ “bargaining power” and about the
perceived injustice of the common law approach.19 This system dominates the current system of
statutory protections for workers in America20; it also dominates the more aggressively workerprotective system of employment and labor law in Europe. The rise of nonwaivable employees’
rights can be seen in part as a surrogate for a more robust system of collective bargaining.21 But
at the same time, it can be seen as a way of relieving the pressure to create that very system. If
statutory protections are in place, a union might seem unnecessary; the law is already giving
employees what the union might have provided. A robust system of statutory guarantees would
make union representation far less desirable. In addition, an approach based on nonwaivable
workers’ rights might be criticized on grounds of its rigidity; perhaps many workers could be
better off with the flexibility to trade some goods for others, and perhaps consumers would
benefit as well.22
C. Workers’ Rights, With Bargaining
Several possibilities are missing from this picture. Most important: What if the law
allocates the relevant entitlement to employees, but also makes the right waivable, in the sense
that the employer could buy it, and the employee could sell it, for a fee? In principle, there is
nothing at all strange about this idea. With respect to the employee’s time, for example, the
common law allocates rights in exactly this fashion; before employment, the individual has a
property right (over the course of his day), but the employer can purchase the right for whatever
amount the employee is willing to accept. We could easily imagine a system in which waivable
workers’ rights were a far larger part of the picture. For example, employees might have, but
might be permitted to waive, rights not to be discharged without good cause; rights not to fired
on grounds or race, sex, religion, and age; rights to health insurance and occupational safety;
rights to parental leave; rights to vacation time; and much more. All of these rights would
operate as default rules for employers to purchase if a mutually agreeable deal can be arranged.

18

See Samuel Estreicher, Labor Law Reform in a World of Competitive Product Markets, 69 Chi-Kent L Rev 3
(1993).
19
See, e.g., Lawrence Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom, 67 Colum L Rev 1404 (1967).
20
See, e.g., 29 USC 651 et seq. (Occupational Safety and Health Act); 29 USC 201 et seq (Fair Labor Standards
Act, with minimum wage and maximum hour provisions); 42 USC 2000e-2000e-17 (Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title
VII); 29 USC 2601 et seq. (Family and Medical Leave Act).
21
Cf. Charles Fried, supra note (arguing for a statement of nonwaivable entitlements as a replacement for collective
bargaining). Fried’s argument is criticized in Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity, 51 U Chi L
Rev. 1041 (1984).
22
This is a generalization of the argument in Richard Epstein, Forbidden Grounds (1995).
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Waiver might operate individually or collectively; the law may or may not impose constraints on
waivers.
What is absent from the traditional account is not only a full sense of the legal
possibilities, but also an adequate picture of workers’ judgments and motivations. To the extent
that analysis of labor law has worked from any such picture, it is the one found in traditional
economics.23 But we know enough to know that this picture is inaccurate. Indeed, we know a
great deal about how it is inaccurate, and about what must be done to make it more nearly
correct.24 I attempt here to bring a better understanding of human behavior to bear on the various
alternatives.
The Article comes in eight parts. Part II discusses the debate over “at will” employment,
with reference to emerging developments that suggest a possible waivable right to be discharged
for cause. Part III discusses some arguments for a nonwaivable background rule, the standard
approach in modern statutory law. Part IV generalizes the idea of waivable workers’ rights by
briefly exploring a number of contemporary questions in employment law. Part V discusses
problems with that idea, with particular reference to third party effects, information-processing,
and collective efforts to change norms and values. Part VI discusses the difference between
individual waivers and union waivers. Part VII deals with the fact that workers care partly about
relative economic position, and not only about absolute economic position – a fact that helps
support the idea of nonwaivable terms. Part VIII is a brief conclusion.
II. An Illustration: The At Will Debate
The debate over the contract at will has recently become one of the liveliest in all of
private law.25 In some ways this debate is unique, for reasons that I will discuss in some detail;
but it also has features in common with related debates involving parental leave, vacation time,
health care, age discrimination, and much more. With the large decline in private-sector unions,26
the common law is now a principal arena for new contests about the nature of management-labor
relations, and the permissible grounds for discharge under the evolving common law have thus
received a great deal of judicial as well as academic attention.27 My particular goal is to show
how a better understanding of human behavior casts new light on the issue,28 in a way that
unequivocally suggests the hazards of relying on a system of waivable employers’ rights, and
that also suggests, though more equivocally, the value of creating waivable employees’ rights
instead.

23

See, e.g., id.
For an overview, see Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1991); see also Behavioral Law and Economics
(Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
25
For discussion, see Stewart Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice, 92 Mich L. Rev. 8 (1993); Richard Epstein, U Chi L Rev
(1984); Pauline Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law, 1999 Univ of Ill L Rev 447; Pauline Kim, Bargaining With
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 Cornell L Rev
105 (1997); Paul Weiler, Governing the Workplace (1991).
26
See Estreicher, supra note. The percentage has fallen from about 35% in 1945 to about 10% in 2000.
27
See Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting For Employment, 74 Tex L Rev 1783 (1996).
28
As far as I am aware, the only existing discussion of the contract at will, from the point of view, can be found in
the illuminating discussion in id.
24
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A. Background and Movement
In America, the general rule is of course that employment is “at will”; an employer can
fire an employee for any reason or for no reason at all. In the last decades, however, courts have
made three inroads on this rule. First, they have created a set of “public policy” exceptions to the
at will rule.29 Hence an employer may not discharge an employee for refusing to commit a crime
on his behalf. A key organizing idea here is that when a third party interest is at stake, there is an
exception to the at will principle.30 Second, courts have found an implied “covenant of good faith
and fair dealing,” an idea that seems to forbid opportunistic discharges -- as, for example, when
an employer discharges an employee before receiving a commission, a pension, or some other
benefit that seems to have been earned.31 The best rationale for these decisions is that they violate
implicit contractual understandings.32 Third – and as we shall see, most interesting for current
purposes – courts have made some movement toward “inferring” a contractual term of job
security on the basis of ambiguous commitments from employers, such as a vague promise
(referring to “permanent employment”) and employee manuals (even those that contain express
disclaimers).33 In many states, the law is in flux. Montana has enacted a statutory program
designed to replace the at will rule with a nonwaivable for cause regime,34 and in 1991, the
National Conference of Commissions on State Laws adopted a similar rule as the Uniform
Employment Termination Act.35
B. Of Waiver and Default Rules: Does It Matter Who Has The Entitlement?
Under the at will rule, the common law confers the relevant entitlement on the employer.
But entirely within a system of freedom of contract, it would be equally possible to confer the
entitlement on the worker. Might it be sensible to give workers protection against discharge
without cause, but to allow them to waive that protection for an agreed-upon price36? The initial
question is whether, in a regime of freedom of contract, the default rule matters at all.
1. The endowment effect and “sticky” default rules. The Coase theorem says that if
transactions costs are zero, the initial allocation of the entitlement does not matter.37 The Coase
theorem actually suggests two different points. First: Whatever the content of the legal rule, the
29

See, e.g., Brigham v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 935 P.2d 1035, 1059-60 (1997); Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Remington Freight Lines v. Larkey, 644 NW2d 931 (Ind. App. 1994); Belline v. KMart Corp., 940 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1991).
30
See Stewart Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for Third Party Effects, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1943
(1994).
31
Merrill v. Crothall-American, 606 A.2d 96 (Del. 1992); Hoffman La Roche v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala.
1987); K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364 (1987). Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 NE2d 1251
(1977).
32
See Schwab, supra note.
33
See below.
34
Mont. Code Ann. 39-2-901 (1997)
35
Model Employment Termination Act, reprinted in Mark Rothstein and Lance Liebman, Employment Law 208-19
(1997) Statutory Supplement).
36
The possibility is omitted in the discussion in Epstein, supra note; Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
358-59 (5th ed. 1998), apparently on the emphatically false assumption that it would be no different from a waivable
employers’ right.
37
See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost. 3 J Law and Econ 1 (1960).
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parties will bargain their way to the efficient solution. Second: Whatever the content of the legal
rule, the parties will bargain their way to the same solution. If these points are right, it does not
matter, assuming no transactions costs, whether an employer or an employee is given the
relevant entitlement. The question is how the Coase theorem bears on the selection of default
rules in the context of employment law.
Let us begin by supposing that with respect to contracting around the job security term,
transactions costs are zero. Is the Coase theorem correct? It is clear that the theorem is on firm
ground insofar as it suggests that the parties will bargain their way to an efficient result,
whatever the content of the legal rule. This is very close to a definition of efficiency. If the
employer very much wants an at will rule, and if the employee does not care much about job
security, the contract will provide for at will employment, regardless of the content of the legal
rule. If the background rule is at will, there will be no contractual shift; if the background rule is
for cause, the parties will bargain their way to an at will situation. Efficiency will follow no
matter what the legal rule is.38
Will the legal rule be not merely efficient but also the same? Notwithstanding the Coase
theorem, there is good reason to think that it will not be.39 The principal reason is the endowment
effect, in accordance with which people tend to place a far higher value on an object if it is
initially allocated to them than if it is initially allocated to someone else.40 Default rules have a
tendency to stick, in labor contracts as elsewhere. If people are initially given a right to a certain
good, they are likely to ask more to give it up than they would be willing to pay for it in the first
instance.41 If for cause protection is initially given to the employee, it seems reasonable to predict
that the employee will demand more to relinquish job security than he would be willing to pay to
obtain the right in the first instance. If a right to discharge at will is given to employers, it
follows that employers will demand more to give it up than they would pay to purchase it in the
first instance. Thus the allocation of the legal entitlement, to workers or to employers, will likely
matter in the sense that the ultimate outcome will be affected by the increased value placed upon
the right simply by virtue of the initial allocation.42
So long as the right is initially allocated to one or another side, an endowment effect
cannot be avoided; but much more thought needs to be given to the question how to select a
default rule in the presence of endowment effects. This remains a largely unexplored question.
Here are some relevant considerations:

38

Of course the legal rule may have distributional consequences. If the employment right at issue is a large part of
the wealth of either side, its allocation to one or another side will contribute to relative wealth. But in this context, it
is difficult to see how the choice of one or another waivable rule will have significant distributive effects. So long as
the parties can bargain, workers are not going to be poorer or richer if the default rule is one way rather than the
other.
39
See Richard Thaler, Quasi-Rational Economics (1993).
40
For evidence in the area of default rules, see Russell Korobkin, Behavioral Economics, Contract Formation, and
Contract Law, in Behavioral Law and Economics 116 (Cass R. Sunstein ed. 2000).
41
See id.
42
Compare the suggestion in R. Posner, supra note, at 359: “If the requirement were optimal it would be negotiated
voluntarily.” The suggestion is not wrong, but it neglects the possibility that the initial allocation of the right will
determine what it is optimal.
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Whether one or another endowment effect is to be preferred cannot be decided on standard
efficiency grounds. So long as transactions costs are zero, either allocation would produce
efficiency. A less standard analysis, also aimed at efficiency, would ask who would gain
most from one or another endowment effect. If, for example, workers, having been initially
allocated for cause protection, would demand a great deal to give it up, and if employers,
having been initially given at will protection, would be willing to sell job security for a small
price, then we would have reason to believe that efficiency favors a for cause rule. The
problem with this analysis is that it must usually be conducted in the absence of data, and
involves some speculation about what people would do or prefer in (counterfactual)
circumstances.
The easiest cases for choosing one or another default rule involve third-party effects. Indeed,
if there are significant third-party effects a nonwaivable rule would probably be best, so as to
protect third parties. With job security, however, no such third-party effects are obvious.
Compare the question how to handle rights to parental leave. Suppose that children benefit
from parental leave requirements (a proposition that is not obviously true; if such
requirements reduce wages and employment, children might be hurt as well). If so, the best
approach is probably to create a nonwaivable right to parental leave.
We might want to ask whether there is a distributional reason to favor one or another rule. I
will take up this issue in more detail below. For the moment note two simple points. First, an
allocation of the legal right to workers would tend to increase the wealth of workers as a
class. Second, significant distributive effects should not be expected in this context, because
the resource gain, from the initial allocation, is not a large part of workers’ wealth.
An important question is whether aside from efficiency and distribution, desirable social
effects would follow from creating a “sticky” default rule of a certain kind. An endowment
effect of one or another sort might be supported if it could be shown to have valuable effects
on social attitudes and norms. If, for example, it were thought important to inculcate an
attitude, on the part of workers, of support for the right of job security, the case for a
waivable workers’ right would be strengthened. The line between a very sticky default rule
and a nonwaivable right might be one of degree rather than one of kind; I take up this point
below.

2. Nonzero transactions costs: paper, information, signaling. Of course transactions costs
are not zero in the context of employment contracts. Some costs are presented merely by virtue
of the need to generate paper to contract around an undesired background rule. Some costs come
from the phenomenon of signaling.43
a. Paper and information. If courts select a rule that most parties dislike, the paper
costs, while unlikely to be huge, may not be trivial. It would be necessary to produce
formal documents where silence would otherwise be sufficient. Probably more important
are information costs. Employers are repeat players, and perhaps they have sufficient
information to know what they are doing when they ask for or sign a waiver. But
employees are frequently imperfectly informed, to say the least.44 If the legal right is
allocated to employers, employees may refuse to ask for job security because they
43

For general discussion, see Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (2000); in the context of employment law, see the
discussion of severance pay in Truman Bewley, Why Wages Don’t Fall During A Recession 268-69 (2000).
44
See Pauline Kim, supra note.
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already believe that they have it, or because they are unable to think well about the
subject. The existence of information costs means that the initial allocation of the legal
right might turn out to matter a great deal, both to efficiency and to the ultimate outcome.
I will return to this point shortly.
b. Signaling. Signaling problems create special problems in the area of job
security. An employer who is willing to offer job security might find that it is attracting
marginal workers.45 At the same time, an employee who presses hard for job security
might be signaling that he will deserve to be discharged. Even if employers and
employees would generally be better off with a system of job security, many individual
employers and individual employees will rationally refuse to negotiate for it. Note that
these points apply to many contractual rights for which employees might bargain. An
employee might fail to seek a right to parental leave, perhaps in the belief that such a
right already exists, more likely with the thought that the very request would signal a lack
of commitment to work. In these circumstances, a waivable employers’ right is likely to
stick even if it is undesirable. There is evidence that this happens with respect to
severance pay; employees do not seek severance pay because doing so sends a bad
signal.46 The same stickiness may well be true of a waivable employers’ right.
These points do not demonstrate that one waivable rule is better than another. But they
are sufficient to show that the choice of the default rule is likely to matter a great deal, both to
efficiency and to ultimate outcomes,
C. What Mimics the Market?
Suppose, then, that the legal rule will indeed matter. Under the conventional approach,
one with obvious implications for labor-management relations in general, courts should seek the
default rule that best “mimics the market,” in the sense that it is the rule that employers and
employees, armed with adequate information, would generally seek.47 In the context of labor law,
it is not entirely clear that the legal system should choose the approach that would mimic the
market, even if it can identify that approach. Perhaps a different approach will redistribute
resources in a desired direction,48 or will have a salutary effect on the formation of preferences.
But let us begin by approaching the choice of the waivable term in the conventional terms.
1. The simple case for at will employment. Those who argue for a waivable employers’
right claim that this is what employees and employers would generally seek, and thus that the
existing background rule “mimics the market.”49 On this view, employers have a strong reason to
resist a for cause regime, partly in order to immunize themselves from illegitimate and even
frivolous suits, and partly in order to ensure against shirking. Perhaps industrial custom supports
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this view; certainly employment at will seems to be the general rule.50 With an at will rule,
employers can prevent costly litigation whenever someone is discharged. They can also
counteract the risk of opportunistic behavior by employees, in the form of shirking.51 More
particularly, the right to discharge on whatever grounds the employer likes operates as an
obstacle to employee performance that falls well below what the employee is able to do – a
special virtue in light of the fact that shirking is both hard to monitor and hard to prove to third
parties.52 And because operating a for cause system is likely to be expensive, most employers,
and most employees, are the beneficiaries of the at will rule.
For those who believe that at will is the market-mimicking rule, it is also important to
emphasize that most employees are generally unlikely to object to this rule. In a market
economy, employers are quite unlikely to fire employees for no reason.53 It is costly to get rid of
good workers, and employers who fire people for no reason will have some trouble replacing
them, simply because arbitrary discharges will have harmful reputational consequences, thus
leading prospective employees to seek work elsewhere. A separate point is that employees
typically develop at least some degree of firm-specific human capital; they are worth more to
their own employer than they would be worth to other employers, because they have experience
with the firm, and they know something about its operations and expectations. The fact that
employees have firm-specific capital creates a built-in safeguard against unmotivated
discharges.54
If employers generally would lose a great deal from a for cause system, and if employees
generally would gain little, the at will rule stands adequately defended, as a background rule that
replicates the likely result of bargaining. The only people who stand to gain from a for cause
system are marginal workers, prominently including those who deserve to be discharged for poor
job performance, but who would be immunized, in practice, by an at will system.
2. Problems. However plausible, this argument is not obviously correct; it depends on
contentious empirical assumptions. Suppose, for example, that a for cause regime would not
much affect employer practices, because in any sensibly designed system, discharge could occur
at low cost whenever cause existed, and precisely because employers have little interest in
discharging people for a reason other than cause.55 If for cause discharge is the ordinary practice,
and if arbitrary discharges are infrequent, employees should have little to lose from a legal rule
that requires cause -- unless (and perhaps this is the key point) the costs of administering a forcause regime turn out to be high. But where cause exists, employees would of course lose their
suit in any case, and hence they are likely to bring suit, especially in light of the cost of doing so.
A mechanism that pushes contests toward low-cost resolution –- such as arbitration – should
ensure that employers have little to fear from a for cause regime. For all these reasons, it is
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unclear that employers would greatly prefer an at will system to a sensibly designed for cause
system.
At the same time, it is reasonable to suppose that many employees might well care a great
deal about obtaining for cause protection, if only to obtain immunity from employer malice or
mistake. Employee concern is likely to be greatest in late career, when opportunistic discharges
become more probable; it is here that employers have special incentives to discharge employees,
in violation of an implicit deal.56 But even earlier, employees are likely to be willing to pay
something for job security (or to require employers to pay something to take it away). On this
view, a for cause regime might be the best market-mimicking approach. Crucial empirical issues
here involve, first, the cost of operating a for cause system and, second, the extent to which
employees would actually be at risk in an at will system.
Because a final answer would turn on resolving those empirical issues, nothing said here
demonstrates that a waivable workers’ right would be the market-mimicking solution – that such
an approach would actually reflect the outcome of informed bargaining by most employers and
employees. But enough has been said to show that any judgment on that point depends on
empirical questions that cannot be answered by a priori arguments.
3. Informational problems. An additional weakness of the argument that an at will system
is market-mimicking has to do with informational problems. Above all, employees are
apparently unaware that in the face of contractual silence, they are entering into an at will
arrangement. Even if they know the basic fact, they may not understand exactly what it means.
Recent evidence, compiled by Pauline Kim, strongly suggests that workers believe that
employment is generally for cause, not at will, and that discharge is therefore unlawful unless
there is a job-related reason for it.57 In Missouri, for example, Kim found that extremely strong
majorities of employees – 80% or more – believe that the following grounds for discharge,
entirely lawful in Missouri, are in fact unlawful: the employer wants to hire someone else to do
the same job; the employer mistakenly believes that the employee stole money; the employer
personally dislikes the employee.58 Similar results were found in California and New York,
notwithstanding substantial variations in the law of the three states.59 The most general finding is
that overwhelming majorities falsely believe that discharges that fall short of good cause are
prohibited by law.60
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Why do workers misstate the law? As Kim notes, it is possible that workers’ belief to this
effect is based on an understanding of workplace norms, rather than law.61 Perhaps the informal
law of the workplace bars arbitrary discharges, even when state law does not.62 This is certainly
possible; but why would workers say that what employers can do, as a matter of law, is the same
as what they actually do, as a matter of practice? Behavioral economics and cognitive
psychology suggest some possibilities. People tend to be optimists, and they often engage in
wishful thinking63; they like to reduce cognitive dissonance, by drawing their beliefs about how
things should be in line with their views about how things are. But I suggest a more particular
hypothesis, one that remains to be tested. People’s beliefs about what the law is are likely to
reflect their beliefs about what the law should be. But for present purposes, the key point is
simple: The fact that workers believe that they have legal protection against arbitrary discharge
much weakens the suggestion that an at will default rule accurately captures the shared
understanding of the parties.
D. The Information-Eliciting Default Rule: A Waivable Workers’ Right
If we are uncertain about what rule would mimic the market, we might seek a background
rule that operates not to mimic the market but to elicit information – that imposes on one or
another of the parties the obligation to provide the crucial information to the other side (and also
to courts).64 On which party should this burden be imposed? It makes obvious sense to say that
employers can more cheaply propose a provision that will make matters clear. A simple
conclusion follows: If employers really would like a system of at will employment, then courts
should say that the background rule is for cause, simply in order to elicit, from them, a clear
statement to this effect, so that both parties to the contract know its real content.65
In the abstract, this view might be defended simply on the ground that a choice of the
market-mimicking rule depends on empirical issues that have not been resolved. Without
evidence, and without reason to believe that evidence would strongly support one or another
solution, an information-forcing rule seems best. But Kim’s findings provide further support for
this view. They are devastating to the idea that employees know that this is the rule, and enter
into contracts with their eyes wide open. They strongly support the suggestion that the
appropriate background rule is for cause, not to mimic the market, but so as to ensure that
employers furnish the relevant information to the employee, and obtain a waiver if they can.
The essential argument for a waivable workers’ right to job security is now in place. We
lack much ground for confidence about the content of a market-mimicking rule. Lacking that
confidence, a for cause regime seems best, as a way of forcing disclosure and overcoming what
appears to be a lack of information on the part of workers. And if the argument is sound, it
applies in many areas of labor and employment law, as we shall shortly see.
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E. Doctrinal Support
These suggestions are not entirely without doctrinal support. In the last two decades,
courts have moved in the direction of creating an informational-forcing default rule for job
security. Mere silence does not create a waivable workers’ right. But ambiguous statements,
plausibly taken as conferring job security, are often taken to prevent at will discharge; and if
employers are to escape that result, they must do so via a disclaimer that is exceedingly clear.
1. Old law. For many decades, an apparent but ambiguous promise by an employer would
not create a contractual obligation to provide security.66 Employment manuals, for example,
would not count as part of any contractual relationship. In the same vein, a statement by an
employer or a personnel manager to the effect that the employee could work “as long as he did a
good job,” or “permanently,” would not provide a for cause guarantee, at least if it was
unaccompanied by a defined term for employment.
These results seem odd; they treat a promise apparently giving something to an employee
as if it had no meaning at all. How might the pattern of decisions be explained? One possibility is
that courts, in the relevant cases, are making a claim about the reasonable expectations of most
parties, having made or heard statements of this sort. Perhaps an employee who has been told
that he has “permanent” employment does not reasonably understand this as a promise, rather
than a hope or expectation. But another, more interesting possibility is that courts are creating a
kind of information-forcing default rule, to the effect that ambiguous statements will not create a
for cause situation, and employees must obtain greater clarity if this is in fact what they want. A
justification for this seemingly harsh result is that it prevents both parties and judges from
guessing about the meaning of words that cannot really be taken as face value. An oral reference
to “permanent” employment cannot mean that the employer will be allowed to work there
forever; the statement must be qualified in various ways, and perhaps the court does not want to
have to do the qualifying on its own. Treating the promise as a kind of goal, rather than a
promise, prevents judicial guessing-games.
2. New law. But the law has changed a great deal, along these dimensions, in the last two
decades. Courts have read employment manuals to create enforceable obligations, even when the
relevant terms have ambiguity (as in, it is “the policy” of the company to fire people for cause).
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross,67 for example, the personnel manual said, in general terms, that it “is
the policy of the company to treat employees in a fair and consistent manner and to release
employees for just cause only.” It was clear that under longstanding law, this statement would
not be sufficient to overcome the at will presumption, in part because no term of years was
identified. Nonetheless, the Michigan Supreme Court held that this was sufficient to create an
obligation of continued employment, notwithstanding the absence of a specified term of years.
Indeed, some cases have entrenched the relevant provisions, to the extent that a
disclaimer is unlikely to be effective unless it is exceptionally clear. Thus, for example, the
Wyoming Supreme Court was confronted with an employee handbook containing the following
language: “READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. I agree that any offer of employment,
66
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and acceptance thereof, does not constitute a binding contract of any length, and that such
employment is terminable at the will of either party, subject to appropriate state and/or federal
laws.”68 The court held that the disclaimer was ineffective notwithstanding this express
statement. The reason was that it “was not set off by a border or large print, was not capitalized,
and was contained in a general welcoming section of the handbook.”69 The court’s decision is
hardly unique. In a number of cases, courts have said that disclaimers must be extremely clear.70
In addition, oral promises are frequently taken as binding, even if they have a degree of
ambiguity. Thus, for example, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross,71 the court was confronted not only
with a personnel manual but also with statements, from personnel officers to employees, that an
employee would be able to continue to work “as long as I did my job,” and or as long as “I was
doing the job.”72 In an alternative holding, the court held that these statements were sufficient to
justify an action for wrongful discharge, even if a specific term of years was not identified. Many
cases find oral statements of this kind sufficient to create a right not to be discharged without
cause.73
These cases might be taken to reflect a new understanding of the reasonable expectations
of employees, when presented with statements of this kind. Perhaps the modern cases reflect a
belief that reasonable employees think that such statements give them job security. But the
decisions might also be understood as a modest step in the direction suggested here: toward a
waivable workers’ right to job security, on information-forcing grounds. The idea is that the
employer is in the best position to control the sorts of statements that are made to employees,
and if ambiguous statements are made, the employer ought to correct the ambiguity, so as to
negate any employee belief that a for cause arrangement has been created. The disclaimer cases
fit this rationale particularly well. They are a kind of consumer protection measure, saying that if
there is any chance that the employee will misunderstand what he has been promised, it is the
employer’s job to make an unambiguous correction.
It is a quite short step from these cases to a waivable employees’ right to job security.
The evidence suggests that ordinary employees, not told anything at all, are in the same position
as employees told that their employers’ “policy” is to retain them unless their performance is
unsatisfactory.74 Employees typically believe that this is both policy and law. And if this is the
understanding of most employees, employers should be required to make a correction.75
III. Counterarguments and Anti-Waiver
Thus far I have suggested that in the context of job security, a waivable employers’ right
might be preferred over a waivable workers’ right, on the ground that the former is the market68
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mimicking rule, but that without good evidence on that question, a waivable workers’ right
seems better, because it is an information-forcing rule. I have also suggested that the default rule
will indeed matter. But I have not discussed whether a nonwaivable workers’ right would be best
of all, and it is now time to discuss that possibility.
A. Unequal Bargaining Power and Redistribution
Many of those who challenge the at will system stress the possible inequality of
bargaining power between employers and (many) employees, and suggest that a shift to a for
cause system would produce a desirable form of redistribution to employees, above all to the
most vulnerable workers.76 The reference to “inequality of bargaining power” must mean that
many of the deals between employers and employees are harsh from the standpoint of the latter,
and that the law should attempt to ensure a fairer arrangement. We should accept the claim of
harshness, at least with respect to many of the relevant deals. Some employees have few good
options, and in these circumstances, the best arrangement that they can get is often quite harsh,
even unfair, in the sense that they are working very hard and receiving little in return. There is no
reason whatsoever to think that the market wage has any special moral status.77
But the redistributive argument nonetheless stands on fragile ground – not because the
existing distribution of entitlements and resources is good, but because blocking the exchange,
through a nonwaivable right to job security, is an unlikely way to produce the desired
redistribution.78 A nonwaivable workers’ right to job security – and there is a general lesson for
employment law here -- is an unreliable way of redistributing resources to workers. A “for
cause” provision does not redistribute resources from employers to employees; it produces
restructured deals, which may or may not benefit employees as a class. When mandatory for
cause provisions are imposed, someone is going to have to pay for them. The burden may well
fall on consumers or even workers themselves, in the form of lower wages, worse retirement
benefits, or lower employment on balance (through, for example, more extended screening of job
candidates, or refusals to take risks by employing people in the first instance). There can be no
assurance that any redistribution to employees will make them better off as a class.79 In fact there
is evidence that workers might lose in salary or other benefits most of, or as much as, they gain
via the nonwaivable term (with the qualification that unionized workers appear to suffer from
lower, or no, wage offsets).80
76

See Clyde Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal, 62 Va L Rev 481 (1976); Lawrence Blades,
Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom, 67 Colum L Rev 1404 (1967).
77
To some this will be a controversial claim and I will not defend it here.
78
For an overview of the theoretical considerations, see Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of
Mandated Benefits, 79 Amer. Econ. Rev. (Papers & Proceedings) 177 (1989). For a recent discussion with special
reference to benefits limited to subgroups of workers, see Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, Stan. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2001).
79
Note the possibility that workers care not about absolute economic position but mostly or partly about relative
economic position; if this is true, nonwaivable workers’ rights might be justified on the ground that they provide a
beneft, in the form of increased job security, while also keeping relative economic position constant. See Robert
Frank, Choosing the Right Pond (1983); see also section VII below.
80
See Jonathan Gruber, The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits, 84 Am. Econ. Rev. 622 (1994), and Price
Fishback and Shawn Kantor, Did Workers Pay for the Passage of Workers’ Compensation Laws, 110 Q J Econ. 713
(1995) (finding substantial wage offsets): “Analysis of the effect of the introduction of workers’ compensation on
wages shows that in the coal and lumber industries, workers experienced substantial wage offsets. In the coal

16

The redistributive argument for nonwaivable terms might be fortified with the suggestion
that workers face a collective action problem that is best solved via law. John Stuart Mill
outlined the argument long ago, suggesting that with respect to a reduction in hours worked, the
limitation “will not be adopted unless the body of operatives bind themselves to one another to
abide by it. . . . For however beneficial the observance of the regulation might be to the class
collectively, the immediate interest of every individual would le in violating it; and the more
numerous those were who adhered to the rule, the more would individuals gain by departing
from it. . . . Assuming then that it really would be the interest of each to work only nine hours if
he could be assured that all others would do the same, there might be no means of their attaining
this object but by converting their supposed mutual agreement into an engagement under penalty,
by consenting to have it enforced by law.”81
Mill’s suggestion is sufficient to show that with respect to any particular contract term,
workers who are currently employed at a firm might well do better with a nonwaivable legal
constraint than without one. But as an argument that nonwaivable terms promote redistribution,
two problems remain. First, and as noted, the compensation package might be adjusted to the
detriment of workers; it is even possible that workers will lose in wages what they gain in
reduced hours, and the resulting package might be worse from their point of view.82 Second, the
result of the nonwaivable term might well be to increase unemployment, even if – indeed
precisely because -- current workers are made better off.83 The increase in unemployment is a
serious problem from the distributive point of view, especially because the people who are
thrown into joblessness are likely to be among the least advantaged members of society.
These points do not demonstrate that nonwaivable terms cannot be justified from the
standpoint of producing desirable redistribution.84 Perhaps the wage offset will be less than
100%; in the unionized sector, for example, there appears to have been no wage offset as a result
of workers’ compensation legislation.85 Perhaps the adverse effect on unemployment will be low
and justified in light of the benefits of the nonwaivable term for larger classes of people; perhaps
the problem of increased unemployment can be taken care of through other means. My
conclusion is not that nonwaivable terms are always indefensible on redistributive grounds.86 It is
that the case for such terms, on those grounds, is fragile, and depends on highly uncertain
empirical issues.

industry the offsets were large enough to cover not only the expected monetary value the benefits, but also the
employers’ costs of purchasing the insurance to provide those benefits.” Id. at 736.
81
J.S Mill, Principles of Political Economy 351(Jonathan Riley ed. 1994).
82
See the evidence of substantial wage offsets for workers’ compensation and parental leave, supra note. But note
the relative position problem, taken up in section VII below.
83
On the ambiguous evidence that labor unions increase compensation packages while also decreasing employment,
see Freedman and Medoff, supra note, at 21, 43-60.
84
See, Jolls, supra note (discussing the circumstances in which desirable redistribution will occur).
85
See Fishback and Kantor, supra, at 734.
86
It is generally agreed that regulation via a nonwaivable term is inferior to regulation via a redistributive income
tax. But it is possible that the choice is not between these two options, but between no redistribution at all and
regulation via a nonwaivable term.

17

B. The Problem of Information, With Notes from Behavioral Economics
A sensible reason to create nonwaivable workers’ rights is to ensure that the employee is
adequately informed. We have seen that shifting the entitlement to the worker, while
maintaining freedom of contract, is a way of counteracting worker ignorance.87 But this may not
be sufficient. If workers are allocated the right, but asked to waive it, will they know what they
are doing? This is an empirical question, and it lacks an obvious answer.
1. Intransigent ignorance. With respect to job security, there is evidence that workers will
not believe that a waiver is effective even if they are asked to sign it. The most striking evidence
here comes from Kim’s study. One of Kim’s questions asked employees to evaluate the effects
of a personnel manual providing that the employer “reserves the right to discharge employees at
any time, for any reason, with or without cause.” 88 In New York, California, and Missouri, this
kind of provision eliminates any employer obligation. Nonetheless, in all three states about threequarters of respondents persisted in the belief that a pure cost-saving discharge would be
unlawful notwithstanding the disclaimer.89
It would be possible to respond to such evidence by endorsing a mandatory for-cause
regime. Perhaps employees simply cannot be adequately informed of an employer’s decision to
purchase the relevant entitlement. But if the costs of a mandatory regime are very high, this
would seem an unfortunate conclusion. The best strategy might be to require extremely clear
language so as to ensure that waivers are voluntary and knowing, as, for example, through strong
verbs and specific language.90
2. Excessive optimism. People tend to be risk optimists.91 They believe that they are
peculiarly immune from probabilistic harms faced by others. For example, 90% of drivers
believe that they are safer than the average driver and less likely to be involved in a serious
accident.92 Perhaps workers who waive their rights will believe, wrongly, that they are peculiarly
immune from the risk to which they are subjecting themselves. If this is the case, waivers will be
inadequately informed. It is not clear how to respond to this possibility. Perhaps the best remedy
is not to be a ban on waiver, but efforts to inform employees in the clearest possible terms, so as
to ensure that they are made aware that the risks are ones that they themselves will face.
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3. Inadequate foresight. Signing contracts before the fact, workers may not have a good
sense of what is in their long-term interest.93 They might be myopic or short-sighted. Recent
evidence so suggests.94
As we have seen, the endowment effect means that those who have a benefit are likely to
value it more than those who do not. Oddly, however, it appears that people do not anticipate the
endowment effect.95 In simple studies, people did not see that they would value mundane goods,
such as mugs, far more if they were initially allocated to them. Apparently people do not quite
see how bad it will be to lose something once they have had. A possible conclusion is that
workers will be in a poor position to decide whether or not to waive their rights, because they
will not know, before the fact, how bad it would be to lose their jobs.96 If this is so, waiver might
be banned in workers’ own interests.
To some extent, this problem might be solved via a system of waivable workers’ rights.
In such a system, the presumptive right is with employees, not employers, and hence the
endowment effect need not be imagined. On the other hand, it may be quite hard for employees,
at the time of signing the agreement, to have a full appreciation of what it is that they may be
losing.97 Workers may not sufficiently bargain to retain a legal right of some sort, simply because
they may know not how important (for example) continuation in a particular job.
4. “Editing out.” People sometimes “edit out” events that have very low probability,
even if the ultimate impact of the event is quite large, partly because of simplified “decisional
paths” used for choices having multiple attributes.98 The terms of employment contracts are
numerous, and it is unlikely that most employees will be able to focus on more than a few of
them. In fact protection against arbitrary discharge seems to be a low priority item for most
employees, notwithstanding its potential importance.99 There may be an analogy here with
disaster insurance; people tend not to purchase disaster insurance (for floods and tornadoes, for
example) even when the benefits of doing so clearly seem to exceed the costs.100
These various points hardly create a devastating argument on behalf of a system of
nonwaivable employees’ rights. They raise, first, a number of empirical questions about what is
likely to be involved in waivers, and second, a number of normative questions about how to
handle employee mistakes. Without further empirical information, the judgment about whether
to allow waivers will have to depend on comparing (a) the likely costs of a nonwaivable rule
93
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against (b) the likely costs of employee ignorance and mistake. If it is possible to design a
nonwaivable rule with low costs of administration – as perhaps Montana has done101 –
speculations about employee ignorance may well be sufficient to carry the day. If, on the other
hand, a nonwaivable rule will create serious problems, the speculations should require stronger
empirical support before they can be made decisive.
C. Between Waivable and Nonwaivable: Constrained Waivers
Even if the various objections to waiver are taken to have substantial force, it need not follow
that waiver should be banned. A more flexible approach would be to allow waiver, but only
under certain constraints, perhaps in the form of “floors” on what employees may be allowed to
trade in return for waiving their rights. On this approach, the relevant right would be
“commodified” in the sense that it could be traded on the market; but to protect employees
against a failure of information, waivers would be constrained. It is easily possible to imagine
intermediate solutions.
1. Procedural constraints. At one extreme, law could provide that a waiver is acceptable, but
not simply when an employee has signed an agreement to waive. The waiver must be shown to
be fully informed, perhaps because accompanied by clear language and a cooling-off period, in
which the employee is permitted to reconsider. Consider this a procedural constraint on waivers.
A legal constraint of this kind could be designed to furnish information, directly and also
indirectly, by imposing requirements intended to signal the magnitude of the discussion. A
procedural constraint on waiver could be minimal or much more than that.
The general idea has clear antecedents in current law. We have seen that under the common
law as now understood, employer disclaimers must be extremely clear and conspicuous; explicit
language is not enough. Under the Age Discrimination Act, a similar approach is taken to
waivers of antidiscrimination rights. For rights and claims arising before execution of the waiver,
the statute permits waiver so long as it is “knowing and voluntary.”102 If it is, the waiver counts
as an affirmative defense. To count as knowing and voluntary, the waiver must specifically refer
“to rights or claims arising under” the Act; the employer must be advised in writing to consult
with an attorney before executing the agreement; the employee must be given “at least 21 days
within which to consider the agreement”; the agreement must provide that at least 7 days after
the agreement has been executed, “the individual may revoke the agreement.”103 Most of these
provisions apply as well to waivers in settlement of charges filed with the EEOC.104 These
provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act can be taken as models of a
procedurally constrained waiver. (Waivers may not apply to rights or claims that arise after the
date the waiver is executed; here waiver is entirely blocked,105 an issue that I take up below.)
2. Substantive constraints. At another extreme, waiver might be deemed acceptable, but
only at a price determined by government, not at a price determined by the market. Here there
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is a substantive constraint on waivers. Substantive constraints, like procedural ones, might be
minimal or much more than that.
This approach also has a place in contemporary employment law. An example is the Fair
Labor Standards Act, which allows employees to waive their right not to work more than forty
hours a week, but also at a governmentally determined premium (“time and a half”).106 Or
consider the Model Employment Termination Act, which allows employers and employees to
waive the right to for cause discharge, but only on the basis of an agreement by the employer to
provide a severance agreement in the event of a discharge not based on poor job performance.107
The severance agreement consists of one month’s salary for every year of employment;
interestingly, it is therefore targeted to longevity of service, in a way that maps onto the
employees’ likely growing stake in their job.
For those who are skeptical of simple market waivers, these various approaches supply a
model, in the form, not of a flat ban on waivers, but of a system of substantive constraints,
designed to ensure that the employee is given something of definite value in return for waiver.
D. How To Handle Job Security
I have been attempting to work through issues of job security from a perspective
informed by behavioral economics. The most important goal is to increase understanding of the
underlying issues, not to recommend any particular reform. Nothing I have said suggests that
courts should declare, today or tomorrow, that contracts are presumed to contain an implied term
for job security. An obvious reason is that judicial activity of this kind would disrupt
longstanding understandings on which both employers and employees have relied. To be sure,
job security is an issue that has been resolved to a large degree by the common law. But when
people have organized their relationships on the basis of one understanding, the presumption
should be in favor of maintaining the status quo. Another problem is that courts cannot alone
devise an important part of a sensible for cause system: a simple, low-cost mechanism for
resolving disputes about whether cause exists. By encouraging arbitration, as Montana has
done,108 a legislature can ensure that the consequence of any for cause agreement is not
disastrous, for employers and employees alike. But a waivable workers’ right could produce
serious problems if unaccompanied by a system to ensure that disputes are handled
inexpensively. Because a shift in the default rule would have a disruptive effect on workeremployer relations, it should not be imposed by the judiciary alone.
There are substantive concerns as well. A waivable right of this kind would impose
nontrivial transactions costs for those who seek waiver, and these costs will have to be borne by
someone, perhaps consumers and workers themselves. If workers would generally waive, what is
the point? The best answer is that we do not know if workers would generally waive, and without
knowing whether they would, the point is to test the market by ensuring that waivers are
informed. But under certain assumptions, it would make sense to favor an at will background
rule simply because of distrust of workers’ failure to waive. Perhaps workers would be unwilling
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to sell their right to job security, even at a reasonable price. On this view, the endowment effect,
combined with employee ignorance, would lead employees to demand an exceedingly high
premium for waiver, and the consequence would be adverse effects on workers themselves. If
workers would systematically overvalue job security, the at will rule finds support, rather than a
challenge, from an understanding of human cognition. This is a plausible speculation but no
more than that.
I conclude with two proposals. First, courts should build on existing law so as to take
ambiguous terms as an occasion to require employers to negate any possible worker inference of
job security. Second, state legislatures should experiment with a waivable workers’ right. An
approach of this sort would be more cautious and modest than the Montana solution, which
appears not to have created serious problems.109
IV. Workers’ Entitlements and the Problem of Waiver
The analysis thus far might be applied to many areas of employment and labor law. I
offer a large number of examples here, not to resolve any of them authoritatively, but to show the
generality of this foregoing analysis of the question of entitlements in employment, and also to
explore the attractiveness of waivable workers’ rights in various settings.
There are, however, potential differences between the contract at will situation and other
contexts in which the legal system might choose among waivable employers’ rights, waivable
workers’ rights, nonwaivable workers’ rights, and constrained waivers. To get a bit ahead of the
story, these include (a) the existence of third party effects from some waivers, (b) the possibility
that the reform in question is attempting to change norms and preferences, not to take them as
given, and (c) the fact that some workplace benefits require employers to produce “local public
goods,” for which individual bargaining is unreliable.
A. Occupational Safety and Health
Under federal law, workers are given certain safeguards against hazardous and unsafe
conditions in the workplace.110 But the relevant rights are not waivable. Should workers be
allowed to make trades with their employers? Suppose that employees would willingly trade a
certain level of safety in return for other benefits, such as cash, health care, or leisure time.
Ought the law to authorize the trade?
In an essay in very much the same general spirit as this one, Susan Rose-Ackerman has
suggested a mixed answer, involving a two-tiered approach to protection of workers.111 She
proposes that the federal government should issue rules governing legal minima; these would not
be waivable, because they would reflect levels of safety that reasonable workers would not wish
to relinquish. At the same time, Rose-Ackerman suggests that OSHA should issue “benchmark
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standards,” more protective than the legal minima, that workers could waive for compensation.112
The waivers might be agreed upon individually or collectively, via unions or other representative
structures.
The proposal has many virtues. By calling for certain nonwaivable minima for truly
dangerous conditions, it responds to potential problems with inadequately informed waivers. At
the same time, the proposal grants workers a presumptive right to extra protection; the
endowment effect should ensure that workers do not relinquish that right for little or nothing. To
those who fear that workers will waive their right to “safety” for too little, it might be responded
that safety cannot be determined through some “off-on” switch. The question is the appropriate
degree of safety, and informed people can sensibly resolve that question in different ways,
trading degrees of safety in return for other goods. A special point on behalf of Rose-Ackerman’s
proposal is that expensive safety regulation can be harmful not only to workers’ incomes but also
to workers’ health.113 To the extent that such regulation decreases wages, and increases
unemployment, it can produce mortality and morbidity increases as well. The central question is
whether cognitive and motivational problems will lead workers to waive their rights for too little.
If the set of nonwaivable minima is adequate, and if the initial grant of the right goes to workers,
there is good reason to experiment with a two-tiered approach of this kind.
B. Age Discrimination
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) forbids employers from
discriminating against anyone who is over forty years of age; it also bans practices of mandatory
retirement. Through these provisions, it creates an obvious incentive for employers to devise
some kind of “retirement package” by which older workers might be encouraged to retire.
Although such packages might be deemed a form of age discrimination, it is easy to imagine
circumstances in which such a package would be in the mutual interest of employer and
employee. Suppose, for example, that the employee is generally interested in retiring in any case,
but would not do so without some kind of financial cushion. Suppose too that the employer
wants to replace the older worker with a younger one, believing that the younger worker will
produce substantial productivity gains, at least in the long term.
Incentives for early retirement seem a natural and mutually beneficial solution, and in
fact they were a widespread response to the ADEA.114 To be worthwhile, employers would
naturally seek not only retirement, but also a promise not to sue for violations of the ADEA.
Initially, courts reacted with some ambivalence to the resulting plans.115 Generally they upheld
workers’ waivers of statutory rights, but required that any waiver be “knowing and voluntary.”
Confusion about the meaning of this requirement helped spur Congress to enact the Older
Workers Benefit Protection Act,116 which, as discussed above, authorizes knowing and voluntary
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waivers. Because OWBRA does not permit employees to waive rights that postdate the
execution of the waiver, it does not quite amount to the kind of waivable workers’ right that I
have been discussing here. Instead it permits something like a settlement of a preexisting claim;
the settlement operates as a waiver. The question therefore becomes why employers are not
permitted to ask for waivers before the unlawful activity occurs. Why shouldn’t employers be
allowed to obtain a waiver of a right to bring suit for alleged age discrimination, if employees are
willing to agree?
Christine Jolls has suggested that prospective waivers should indeed be allowed.117 On
her view, the ADEA has, as one of its central purposes, the prevention of opportunistic
discharges, which occur when employers discharge employees in late career, in violation of an
implicit promise to provide continued benefits. The statute therefore has a “hands tying”
rationale that ensures enforcement of these contracts in spite of employers’ incentives to act
opportunistically. This is an efficiency argument for the ADEA; but there is a parallel efficiency
case for allowing the workers’ right to be waivable. On Jolls’ view, “the basic efficiency
argument in favor of prospective waivers is that they allow parties for whom age-based wages
are not desirable – or at least not sufficiently desirable to warrant the costs of imposing legal
liability for cost-based decisions about older workers – to avoid unnecessary and costly
regulation of their private affairs.”118
There is, however, a potential problem here: myopic behavior by workers. As Jolls
acknowledges, young workers are in a poor position to assess the harms possibly to be incurred
by their future selves several decades hence.119 The possibility of myopia may be a sufficient
ground to bar waiver. In principle, it does seem unlikely that waivers of the right to be free from
age discrimination would be adequately informed. If waivers are nonetheless to be permitted – as
I think they should be – it is because freedom from age discrimination is unlikely greatly to
benefit workers, and hence the resulting deals are unlikely to hurt workers.
C. Vacation, Leave Time, and Health Care
A great deal of attention has recently been given to various proposals to improve
workers’ lives through longer vacations, extended leave time, and health care. Critics have
argued that statutory mandates would provide a kind of rigid, “one-size-fits-all” approach to
diverse workplaces, and that the best approach is to allow people to bargain as they wish. It
should now be clear that the criticism is quite reasonable. If employees would like to sacrifice
vacation and leave time, or health care benefits, in return for other elements of a compensation
package, why should they not be permitted to do so?
The contract at will situation has a special feature not present here: Empirical evidence
that workers believe that they already have the right in question. We lack evidence that showing
that workers believe that employers are obliged to provide them with vacation and leave time or
health care. Perhaps they do. Even if they do not, there are good reasons to ensure that if workers
are not going to have these rights, they are made expressly aware that this is something that they
117
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will not have. The natural proposal is that workers have waivable rights to a certain level of
vacation and leave time, along with health care protection – and that employers are able to
purchase these rights for a fee.
It is possible to respond that workers will relinquish these rights too cheaply or that
collective action problems will induce workers to act against their best interests. The response is
generally weak, for reasons discussed above. But workers might lack the information to give
fully knowing waivers, and a form of myopia might produce impulsive action. As in the context
of occupational safety and health, the best response to this concern would be to produce
nonwaivable minima along with procedural or substantive constraints on the waiver of rights that
exceed those minima. What I am generally envisioning, in short, is a two-tiered system, in which
workers are providing with a floor below which no workplace may go, together with a set of
waivable rights that respond to the legitimate claim that one size does not fit all. Of course it
would be necessary to say a great deal more in order to grapple with the details.
D. Parental Leave
In 1991, the United States adopted, for the first time, a statute requiring employers to
provide parental leave.120 The Family and Medical Leave Act requires employers to allow
employees up to 12 total weeks of leave during any 12 month period, if the reason for the leave
is to care for a new-born child, to care for a spouse, son, daughter or parent with a serious health
problem, or because of a serious health problem of the employee’s own.121 Employers are not
required to allow employees to allow employees to continue to work at a reduced rate; nor are
they required to pay employees during the time off. The basic idea is that an employee will not
lose her job if she takes leave for one of the stated reasons.
The most notable feature of this legislation is that it transforms a waivable employers’
right into a nonwaivable workers’ right. Is the legislation desirable? It is tempting to think that it
is, because it gives employees an important right that they would otherwise deny in many or
most cases. But this is no simple transfer of resources for employers to employees, and an
obvious question has to do with who really bears the costs of parental leave legislation. There is
good evidence that those who bear the costs are the same as those who receive the benefits –
that parental leave legislation results in a proportional wage reduction for its beneficiaries,
mostly women. If this is the case, is the statute undesirable for that reason? On one view, it
certainly is; the government has simply forced workers to receive in leave time what they would
otherwise receive in income, and the fact that they chose the latter, not the former, suggests that
the latter is what is in their best interests.
But by now it should be clear that this argument is not decisive.122 Workers may be
myopic in failing to seek parental leave protections, especially in light of the fact that before
having a child, it is hard to have a full and vivid sense of the demands that arise after the child is
born. For many workers, there may be no self-conscious thought about parental leave at all; this
may be “edited out” at the time that employment is sought. As in the context of the contract at
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will, both employers and employees may face a signaling problem. Employers who offer
parental leave may find themselves attracting a disproportionate number of workers who want to
take such leave; employees who ask about leave policies in advance may be signaling that they
are not entirely committed to the workforce. Indeed, workers may face a norm against parental
leave, and they may not even know that this norm is something that it is possible to challenge. In
any case parental leave policies can be defended, not principally as protecting workers, but as
protecting children and others for whom workers would like to care. If there are third-party
effects, the case for an inalienable right is greatly strengthened.
At first glance, these considerations would seem to be reasons for disallowing waivers.
But they are not decisive. If parental wages fall as a result of parental leave legislation, children
will be correspondingly hurt. In the general run of cases, there is little reason to think that parents
will not consider the well-being of their children in deciding whether and how much leave time
to take. Whether workers are in a poor position to make that balance in advance cannot be
decided a priori. A real problem is that in initial bargaining, workers are unlikely to be thinking
about considering parental leave when they first take the job.123 And it would be possible to
remedy this problem by giving employees the relevant right, and by allowing them to trade it if
and only if the employers makes the trade worth their while. In these circumstances it would
seem to make sense to consider a two-tiered system here as well, combining statutory minima
with a more ample set of waivable rights.
E. Workers’ Compensation
All states now provide workers’ compensation programs. Moreover, the right to benefit
from such programs is not waivable. Workers enter the employment relationship with assurance
that in the event of accident, they will receive appropriate compensation. Workers’ compensation
programs do not merely have ex post consequences. They also have substantial incentive effects,
leading employers to reduce accidents and injuries. Indeed, there is reason to think that workers’
compensation programs are far more effective than OSHA in improving workplace safety.124
By itself, however, these points do not justify making workers’ compensation programs
nonwaivable. As in the context of parental leave legislation, there is good evidence that that
workers’ wages are cut correspondingly; what they receive from the program, in the event that
they need it, is what they lose in wages. In this circumstances, why shouldn’t workers be able to
waive the relevant rights? If they did, they would be self-insurers, and self-insurance, so long as
it is genuinely voluntary, is not an obviously implausible model for workplace injuries.
There are some familiar answers here. Workers may lack the information that would
make a waiver sufficiently informed, perhaps because of myopia, excessive optimism, or
dissonance reduction. But there is an independent issue. Workers who do not wish to waive their
rights may face a collective action problem, and this problem may well justify a nonwaivable
workers’ right. More particularly, there is a distinctive free rider problem in this context. To see
this, return to the fact that the consequence of workers’ compensation programs is to lead
employers to increase safety in the workplace. The increases often happen because employers
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introduce capital improvements designed to reduce deaths and injuries. To the extent that these
will be made in any case, employees who waive their rights for a fee will receive many of the
protections of the program without paying for it. It is here that there is a problem. If safety is a
local private good – something that, when provided to some, will also be provided to all –
rational individual choices, by workers, are likely to lead to a large number of waivers, and
hence a failure to create incentives to increase safety. This, then, is an area where the argument
for creating a nonwaivable workers’ right is especially strong.
F. Unionization: Company Unions, Ordinary Unions
What of the right to unionize itself? Should that right be waivable? By whom? These
issues are best approached by dividing the inquiry into three issues: individual waivers of the
right to unionize; appropriate default rules for union status; and collective waivers of the right
not to be faced with “company-dominated unions.”
1. Nonwaivable individual employee rights. The rights guaranteed by the Wagner Act,
the foundation of modern labor law, are not waivable by individual employees. Employers may
not “buy” the right to fire employees who join unions as through, for example the “yellow dog”
contract. The rights to join a union, to strike, and to engage in activity for mutual and protection
are not subject to waiver. Why does the statute make this choice, rather than creating a system of
waivable employees’ rights?
There is no obvious answer. The best justification would rely on some combination of the
reasons described above, involving informational, cognitive, and motivational problems. Perhaps
many workers would not know what they were waiving, especially in light of the possibility that
the potential benefits of unionization would not be readily apparent at the time the waiver was
requested. Perhaps both employers and individual workers would face a signaling problem, akin
to that which could arise if, in an at will regime, an employer emphasizes that it will provide job
security (and thus attracts marginal workers), and an employee requests the same (and thus
signals a realistic risk that the employer will want to fire him).
2. Unions at all? The current presumption against. This system of nonwaivable workers’
rights coexists with what is, from the standpoint of the real-world status of unions, probably even
more important: a basic background of a crucial waivable employers’ rights: no collective
representative is in place until employees have affirmatively voted for it. The ordinary
assumption of the workplace, and hence the default rule, is nonunion. The situation that workers
face is one in which organization must be sought, through the processes of union election. Note
that nothing is inevitable or natural about this situation. On the contrary, this “tilt has its roots in
the common law background . . . the tacit legal assumption that the ‘natural’ state for a
workplace is nonunion, with management exercising on behalf of the shareholder-owners the
prerogatives of property and contract law to establish the firm’s terms and conditions of
employment.”125 It would be easily possible to imagine a different regime, in which workers are
presumed to favor collective organization, but in which they are permitted to vote otherwise. If
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union representation is thought to have significant advantages, a system of this sort might well be
preferred.
Many variations are possible. On one approach, workers would start employment with a
presumption in favor of collective organization. A vote would be help to choose the particular
form of that organization (including the particular union that would represent workers); at the
same time, employees could be asked to reject the option if collective organization if they could
be convinced that this is in their best interests. An advantage of this approach is that it could help
overcome the effects of management tactics, many of them unlawful, to help overcome
unionization.126 Another advantage is that this approach would work like an information-forcing
default rule. If we are unsure whether failures of unionization stem from worker preferences or
from employer pressure, a presumption in favor of collective organization would help untangle
that issue. And to the extent that such organization confers benefits on workers without imposing
correlative costs,127 there is much to be said for enlisting the endowment effect on its behalf. If,
on the other hand, collective organization is thought to produce few real benefits for organized
workers, and at the same time to increase both prices and unemployment, the existing default
rule would stand on firm ground. What is most important is to see that the default rule represents
a choice among a range of options and that it is likely to have extremely important effects; any
such rule has to be defended against reasonable alternatives.
3. Company unions. Some of the most important and interesting issues in contemporary
employment law arise as a result of the statutory ban on employer-sponsored workers’
organizations.128 Employers are not allowed to create labor organizations, even if employees
would be satisfied with them – apparently on the theory that employer-sponsored labor
organizations cannot be trusted to protect employee interests.129 The theory seems to be that the
employer should be on only one side not of the negotiating table, not on both sides. Thus Senator
Wagner emphasized the coercion and deception involved in the use of company dominated
unions, with the suggestion that such “sham” organizations were actually served the employer’s
interests, not that of workers. Hence the statutory prohibition was (and is) defended with
reference to a fear of employer coercion, a belief that employees lack the information to make ex
ante waivers, a risk of deceptive practice on the part of employers, and a perception that workers’
preferences, in this context, may be adaptive to an unjust status quo.
In theory, these objections may have made sense in the 1930s, when company unions
were primary tools in union avoidance, and were commonly used as part of a package of unionbusting tactics. But in the last two decades, circumstances have changed in two important
ways.130 First, private sector unions have dramatically declined, and hence the real choice is not
between unions and company-supported substitutes, but between no union and a companysupported substitute. It is hardly clear that no organization at all is best for workers. Second,
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there has been a sharp decline in “Taylorist” conceptions of the workplace, which posit a sharp
split between “brainwork” and the highly mechanical work of ordinary laborers. There is a great
deal of new interest, on the part of employers themselves, in finding ways to increase the role of
employees in designing more efficient workplaces, partly because this step increases worker
satisfaction, partly because it appears to have desirable effects on production. The consequence
of these two developments has been to impose sharp pressure on the prohibition on employeesponsored unions.
Suppose, for example, that an employer wants to create some kind of employees’
organization to improve efficiency, safety, and working conditions. Under current law, this step
is likely forbidden.131 The relevant right cannot be waived by workers acting individually or even
collectively. But suppose that workers have thought long and hard about the issue, and have
decided that they would do better with a company unions than without collective representation
and with an ordinary union. The conventional response here is that the employees’ judgment to
this effect cannot be trusted, because the result of a company union is to place the employer on
both sides of the bargaining table. In this view, the ban on company unions is designed to ensure
against a kind of deceptive packaging – the appearance without the reality of collective
representation – and at the same time to counteract the risk that workers’ preferences will adapt
to an unjust status quo. And if it were correct to say that without company unions, most workers
would be faced with a choice between well-functioning unions and an absence of collective
representation, this argument might be convincing. But the truth is that for a variety of reasons,
unions are not a likely option for most workers – and also that for many workers, some kind of
employee participation plan seems highly attractive, a source of genuine improvements in
workers’ well-being.132 The conclusion is that with at least with procedural constraints designed
to ensure real freedom of choice, workers should be allowed to waive the apparent protections of
the ban on company unions, at least if they do so collectively.

V. Nonwaivable Workers’ Rights
In this section, I generalize from this discussion to identify some grounds for disallowing
waiver. The central cases involve third-party effects, inadequate information, and efforts to
change norms and preferences, which involve third-party effects of a distinctive kind.
A. Third Party Effects
Most obviously, a nonwaivable background rule makes most sense when there are thirdparty effects. There are many examples. As we will see, unions are not allowed to waive
workers’ rights to distribute work-related materials, partly because there is no identity of
interests between the waiving union and the workers whose rights have been waived. The
problem is that the waiver has effects on third parties, that is, workers with interests distinct from
those of the union.
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In a series of common law cases, moreover, courts have created “public policy”
exceptions to the at will rule. The core cases involve situations in which an employer discharges
an employee for refusing to commit a crime (perjury, price fixing) on the employer’s behalf.133 In
other cases, courts have disallowed discharges when the employer is punishing employees for
cooperating with the authorities with respect to possible illegality at the company.134 The
defining theme is that employers may not discharge employees if the consequence is to impose
harms on outsiders to the contractual relationship.135 It should be obvious that waivers are
unacceptable in these circumstances. The waiver is invalid not to protect workers, but to ensure
that others are not adversely affected. For the most part this category of cases is reasonably
straightforward, and hence it is not necessary to discuss it in detail here.
B. Inadequate Information
In some cases, waivers will be inadequately informed. We have seen that this is a key
reason that the law is more hospitable to union waivers than to individual waivers; unions are in
a far better position to know what they are doing. Individual waivers may be inadequately
informed for a large numbers of reasons, including excessive optimism, dissonance reduction,
“editing out,” and myopia.
A great deal of empirical research is necessary to see the extent of the problem. For the
moment, the best approach is to block exchanges that most reasonable people would be unlikely
to waive,136 but otherwise to allow waiver unless there is a particular reason for confidence that
workers are giving up too much for too little. When there appears to be a serious risk to this
effect, it might be best, not to block waiver entirely, but to impose procedural or substantive
limits on acceptable waivers. Requirements of full disclosure, along with a “cooling off” period,
might be a minimal way to proceed.
C. Norm and Preference Change
Now let us turn to some of the most difficult cases for waiver, involving what are perhaps
best treated as subtle third-party effects.
1. Waiver: the basic case. Suppose that an employer is averse to the threat of race or sex
discrimination suits. Seeking to reach a mutually advantageous solution, he asks his employees
to sign an agreement, waiving their rights to bring suit for race or sex discrimination. The
employer adds that he believes that discrimination is wrong and that he does not plan to
discriminate. He is willing to make a premium for a waiver, not in order to discriminate, but to
insulate himself from frivolous or trumped-up lawsuits. Suppose too that a nontrivial number of
employees are willing to waive their rights, because they believe that this is otherwise a good
place to work, because the premium is not trivial, and because they are willing to take their
chances on the matter of race and sex discrimination. Let us assume, plausibly, that if employees
are presumed to have the relevant entitlement, requests for waivers will be relatively rare, partly
133

See Petermann.
Palmeteer.
135
Se Schwab, supra note.
136
See Rose-Ackerman, supra note.
134

30

because of the kind of signal given by such requests. Nonetheless, it is highly likely that some
waiver requests would be made if they were seen as valid. Note in this regard that there is
evidence that some of the discrimination laws do have an adverse effect on hiring members of
the protected class, precisely because of a fear of a lawsuit; an employee in that class represents a
lawsuit waiting to happen.137 Perhaps some of the disemployment effect could be removed with
waivers. Should these waivers be upheld?
It might be tempting to see, in the employer’s proposal, a kind of coercive offer: An
employee is asked to waive his rights in return for a job, and she may seem to have “no choice”
but to waive. On this view, the law should provide protection, and enhance freedom, by banning
the coercive deal. But this account is much too simple. In these cases, the employee is not in a
position of having “no choice”; the question is whether the offer is worthwhile for the employee
in light of the options, perhaps most of them bad, that are available. Unless there is an
informational problem of some kind, the fact that the employee accepts the deal is strong
evidence that it is.
It is also possible to think that for some classes of workers, the sheer number of job
applicants, and the relatively small number of jobs, will mean that employees will be “forced” to
waive; those who do not waive will not end up with jobs. This is certainly imaginable. But in a
market that is so unfavorable to workers, all employment terms will be pushed in unfavorable
directions, including wages. Unless there is some kind of information problem, employees stand
to gain if they can waive the right to be free from discrimination, because those who waive that
right will (by hypothesis) gain more than they lose. The best solution, in a market with this
degree of harshness for employees, is to improve the background conditions faced by those
workers, not to block the best available deal.
2. Third party effects? Thus far, at least, it seems as if discrimination rights should be
fully be waivable. But might individual waivers have adverse effects on other workers? Begin
with the context of sexual harassment, where it is easy to imagine that they would. If one woman
waive her right, and is subject to harassment, other women may well be harmed; the effect will
not be easy to cabin. At least this is so if the waiver and the harassment lead would-be harassers
to believe that harassment is not entirely objectionable or unacceptable, or that reasonable
women are willing to subject themselves to a risk of it for a wage premium.
The example is easily generalized to the case of sex and race discrimination in general.
An African-American who is willing to waive the right to be free from racially-motivated
adverse employment action might well be affecting other African-Americans, by signaling the
legitimacy of discrimination, and by indicating that discrimination is merely a “cost,” to be
purchased and sold like other goods on the market. If discrimination is so regarded, there may
well be more of it than if the signal is different – as, for example, where a flat ban suggests that
discrimination is illicit, the sort of practice to be eliminated, rather than to find some optimal
point.138
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3. Norm and preference change. This claim suggests several possibilities. Some
antidiscrimination law is an attempt to produce norm change. The point of the law is to alter
prevailing norms, and if rights are waivable, that enterprise might be defeated. If workers are
living in accordance with a norm that they abhor but that they wish to change, they are unlikely
to be able to accomplish the change on their own. By its very nature norm change requires
collective action. The waiver is forbidden in order to ensure that certain norms are delegitimated.
A closely related possibility is that the purpose of the relevant right is to produce preference
change. If preferences are not being taken as given, but are being treated as endogenous and
flexible, an argument for preventing waiver might be defended as a method for ensuring that
preferences are in fact changed.
With respect to the validity of discrimination waivers, these arguments are not decisive in
the abstract. In a period in which race and sex discrimination are widely stigmatized, it is
reasonable to believe that permitting waivers would have few significant effects on workers not
parties to the deal, or at the least, that waivers would not have a material effect in entrenching
objectionable norms and preferences. If an employer asks employees to waiver the right to be
free from race or sex discrimination, it is signaling that it is a possible discriminator, and that is
not the most attractive signal to send out to prospective employees. On the other hand, some
employees – white and male? – might welcome that signal, and in these circumstances the ban
on waiver is understandable as an effort to prevent inevitable effects on third parties, who are
likely to be affected by the legitimization of the underlying practice. When the law is engaged in
a self-conscious effort at changing norms and preferences, allowing waivers is too likely to
defeat the enterprise at hand.139
VI. A Brief Note on Union Waivers
The discussion thus far has involved individual waivers; but a frequent issue in
employment law is whether labor unions are themselves entitled to waive workers’ rights. The
general answer is that union waivers are legally acceptable,140 though in some contexts there is a
self-conscious effort to ensure that any waiver is knowing and voluntary, in a kind of procedural
constraint on enforceable waivers.141 Is it possible to explain the law’s receptivity to union
waivers?
There are two points here, sharply distinguishing union waivers from individual waivers.
First, informational problems are highly likely to have been overcome in the union setting. When
a union is waiving, it would be surprising, in the ordinary case, if it did so without really
knowing what it is doing. In all probability, the problem of myopia will also have been reduced;
note in this regard that unions are not solely concerned with wages, and that various fringe
optimal level of pollution, and polluting activity – so long as it is part of a legitimate business, and not an intentional
tort -- is not the kind of thing that it is appropriate to delegitimate.
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benefits, likely to be favored by those interested in the long term, are a special focus of union
bargaining.142 Second, unions overcome the collective action problem faced by individual
workers, and this point lessens the danger that employers will be able to “force” individual
workers to waive by ensuring that they compete to their collective detriment. It should be no
wonder that serious concerns about union waivers seem to arise only when the union has a
conflict of interest, and hence is not in a position to be a good representative of workers. Thus
unions are permitted, in the most noteworthy case, to waive workers’ right to strike.143 With
respect to the rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relations Act, the situation is largely one
of waivable workers’ rights—with the rights being waivable collectively only, and emphatically
not individually.
Consider in this regard cases in which the union cannot be trusted to be a fair
representative of workers’ interested, exemplified by NLRB v. Magnovox Co. of Tennessee.144
In that case, the union agreed to a collective bargaining agreement that banned employees from
distributing literature on any of the employer’s property, including nonworking areas during
nonworking time. It is clear that this rule would violate the law if imposed unilaterally by the
employer; but the union had agreed to it. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court held that the waiver
was not binding, for a collective bargaining agreement could not eliminate these rights. The
Court said that waiver would not be permitted “where the rights of the employees to exercise
their choice of a bargaining representative is involved – whether to have no bargaining
representative, or to retain the present one, or to obtain a new one. The key problem was one of
agency – with respect to continuing debates about self-representation, the union could not be
trusted to be the faithful agent of workers. Here is a distinctive reason to disallow union waivers.
Magnavox is followed by a series of cases that are generally receptive to waivers by unions, but
not when the waiving union is likely to have divergent interests from those of the individuals
whose rights are waived.
One final wrinkle is important here. In many contexts, union waivers must be explicit and
unambiguous. A general “no-strike” clause will not be taken to bar an unfair labor practice
strike,145 and it will also not be taken to create an affirmative obligation on union leaders, to avert
strikes on pain of discipline or discharge.146 If employers are going to obtain rights beyond those
minimally contained in a no strike pledge, they must do so explicitly. Here is a procedural
constraint on the waiver of workers’ rights; and it has proved crucial in the cases.
VII. The Problem of Relative Position
The discussion thus far has neglected an important and highly relevant point from
behavioral economics. I do not discuss it in detail here, because it raises many complexities and
depends on empirical issues on which unambiguous evidence is lacking. But because the point is
significant, and has been neglected in the context of employment and labor law, it requires some
discussion.
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A. Relative Position and the Frame of Reference
Let us acknowledge the that the cost of workers’ rights, when they are not waived, might
be borne in whole or in part by workers, in the sense that the legal grant of a right, to workers,
will result in a lower paycheck. Is the argument against the relevant right therefore established,
on the ground that workers will be net losers? We have seen that one problem with an
affirmative answer is that workers might not be net losers. But a more fundamental problem is
that with respect to income, what workers seem to care about is relative economic position rather
than absolute economic position.147 In other words, what matters to workers is partly how they
compare to others, not how much money they are making in the abstract; and if all workers lose
the same amount, each worker will lose very little, because relative position will not be affected.
If what workers care about is relative position, nonwaivable rights might, in principle, make
workers better off on the dimension along which they are helped (by giving them something
important) while also not making them worse off along the dimension along which they are
apparently helped (by decreasing their income while also decreasing that of everyone else).
Relative position is found by comparing the worker’s income with that of (salient) other
workers; absolute position by looking simply at the number of dollars that the worker makes.
The question is whether workers are significantly worse off in a system in which all (salient)
workers lose, say, .5% of their salary; if this loss has no significant adverse effect, than any
initiative that produces that loss will not, by virtue of that consequence, harm workers at all. And
if this is so, it is because income is, above a certain floor, a positional good, that is, a good whose
value depends on comparison with the holdings of others. The noteworthy possibility here is that
legal initiatives might, in theory, produce real gains of one or another kind (for example, leisure
time, health care, job security, which are, by hypothesis, nonpositional goods), without
producing real losses (because the only loss is to relative position in terms of income).
There is considerable evidence that relative position is in fact what people care about, at
least with respect to income.148 Many people would prefer to work in a place where they earned
(say) $60,000 and the average worker earns $50,000, to working in place where they earn (say)
$70,000 and the average worker earns $90,000. This preference holds where everything else is
equal, that is, where the cost of living is the same in the two places. Why are people prepared to
sacrifice income to ensure certain place in the hierarchy? Undoubtedly envy and status-seeking
play a large role. Some people would like to have a high status and are willing to lose money to
ensure that they do. Perhaps more people would like not to have a low status and are willing to
lose absolute income in order to ensure that they do. But the most important point is more
fundamental. The economic position of other people sets the “frame of reference” within which
we evaluate various goods. If you now had the same computer that you used ten years ago, you
would likely be dissatisfied and frustrated, simply because the frame of reference for evaluation
of the computer has changed so dramatically. But if everyone had the same computers that they
had ten years ago, your decade-old computer would not seem so bad, indeed it might not seem
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bad at all. And if everyone had the same computer that will be in use ten years from now, your
current computer might seem very slow and inefficient.
What is true for computers is no less true for a vast array of goods and services, including
cars, radios, televisions, homes, and even artistic and literary work. People care about relative
position not only because they care about their status, but also because they are aware that the
frame of reference for evaluation is set not individually but socially, and indeed that this is
inevitably the case.
B. Mandatory Terms and Relative Position
For the moment let us simply assume that relative rather than absolute economic position
is what most workers care about – that worker well-being would not be decreased by (say) a
decrease in annual wages of $25, $50, or $100, so long as all workers face the same decrease. In
that event, some nonwaivable terms, such as a right to job security, might be justified on the
following ground: The consequence of the new term is to decrease absolute income but to hold
relative income constant. From this shift, there is little or no welfare loss to workers. At the same
time, workers receive a substantial benefit, e.g., job security, vacation time, or health care. As far
as the worker is concerned, the substantial benefit is given essentially for free, because relative
position is held constant. If relative position is in fact what workers care about, this appears to be
a powerful argument for a wide range of nonwaivable workers’ rights.
C. Difficulties
I believe that this argument is largely correct; but it cannot be shown to be convincing in
the abstract. It raises three questions in particular.
•

•

Perhaps relative position is also what workers carry about with respect to the new, legally
granted benefit; perhaps this too is a positional good. Many goods have a mixture of
positional and nonpositional features. It does seem reasonable to say that such goods as job
security, health care benefits, and leisure time have strong nonpositional features. It is
important to have these things regardless of what other people have; an increase in any of
them, far more than an increase in money, is an independent good. But job security, leisure
time, and the like also have positional features; to lack (say) job security when everyone else
lacks job security is probably better than to lack job security when everyone else has it. For
the argument on behalf of the nonwaivable term to be made convincing, it must be true (a)
that relative position is what matters with respect to income -- or to whatever else is lost as a
result of the nonwaivable term -- but (b) that what matters for the good in question, such as
job security, is not relative but absolute position. Perhaps we can conclude that the
nonpositional features of job security, health care benefits, and leisure time are enough to
give the argument a kind of presumptive validity.
It is possible that a nonwaivable right to a certain largely nonpositional good, such as job
security, will led not only to reductions in income (by hypothesis a positional good) but also
to reductions in nonpositional goods (vacation leave, sick leave, health care, parental leave).
If the grant of one nonpositional good leads to a decrease in others, there will be nothing to
celebrate. There is an empirical agenda here: When government creates a mandatory benefit,
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•

•

to what extent is the result to increase not income, but other, less positional benefits
associated with employment?
To what extent is income actually a positional good? . There is considerable evidence that for
most people, what matters to perceived well-being is their position in the relevant hierarchy,
above a certain minimum level.149 Of course for quite poor workers, absolute income may be
what matters. In poor nations, absolute increases in wealth affect self-reported happiness
levels, not relative position; and absolute increases affect self-reported happiness levels
among the very poor. To the extent that a mandatory term is reducing the income of people
with little to live on, they are not likely to be justifiable on the ground that I have offered. Of
course few mandatory terms will have this effect.
The nonwaivable right may impose ancillary social costs. It might, for example, force prices
to rise, and the resulting inefficiencies may argue against the nonwaivable term. Even when
workers are benefited as a result, the term might not be justified on balance; an increase in
prices is hardly good news for workers (especially poor ones) and if unemployment increase
as well, the nonwaivable term may not be worthwhile.

In light of these points, an understanding of the importance of relative position does not
create a decisive argument for nonwaivable terms in employment law. But it does raise a
possibility, overlooked in conventional discussions of these problems: even if such terms create a
dollar-for-dollar reduction in wages, workers may benefit as a result.
Conclusion
My basic goal in this Article has been to bring a better understanding of human behavior
to bear on the three principal options for employment law: waivable employers’ rights, waivable
workers’ rights, and nonwaivable rights. Contrary to the Coase theorem, the default rule is likely
to matter a great deal. Contrary to the standard view in law and economics, workers are loss
averse. They will be reluctant to give up rights and goods that have been initially allocated to
them – a point confirmed by employers’ reluctance to decrease wages, even during a recession.150
Contrary to the conventional wisdom, workers do not understand that the current system is “at
will,” even though the law to this effect is well established. Contrary to the reflexive
antipaternalism of many lawyers and economists, workers are likely to have difficulty in
deciding whether to waive their rights, and hence the case for nonwaivable terms, defended in
behavioral terms, is far more plausible than it appears, defended in terms of simple
redistribution. Contrary to the standard economic wisdom, workers often care about relative
position, not absolute position. Contrary to standard legal practice, waivable workers’ rights
represent an attractive alternative in many contexts, responsive in particular to workers’ lack of
information. Contrary to a standard legal view, the difference between legal hostility to
individual waivers and legal receptivity to union waivers is defensible on the ground that unions
are less likely to suffer from myopia and other forms of bounded rationality.
More particularly, we have seen that the initial allocation of the legal right may well
matter, both because of the endowment effect and because of the transactions costs of changing
it. The question whether to allow waivers by individual workers turns largely on questions about
149
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information; some of these questions are complex and subtle. We have also seen significant
differences between individual and collective waivers. Many of the concerns about individual
waivers are weakened when workers are waiving as a group. In both the individual and collective
contexts, objections to allowing waiver might be met, not by banning waivers entirely, but via
procedural or substantive constraints.
We have seen more particularly that waivable workers’ rights represent a distinctive,
promising, and insufficiently explored approach to the law of labor relations. A system of this
kind will often be preferable to the more standard alternatives of waivable employers’ rights and
nonwaivable workers’ rights. To the extent that workers might undervalue the rights initially
allocated to them, and sell them for a price that is too low, it is sensible to consider, as an
alternative to a ban on waiver, a system of constrained waiver, ranging from requirements of
disclosure, to a cooling-off period, to legal floors on what employees will receive through the
relevant trades.
In the area of the contract at will, I have suggested that legislatures should experiment
with waivable for cause rules, and also that courts should move in this direction by penalizing
employers who lead employees to believe that they have protection against at will discharge (as,
for example, through promises of “permanent” employment and through statements of “policy”
to retain all good employees). If progress is to be made in improving worker well-being without
introducing excessive rigidity into the labor market, the best route for the future will consist of
more creative experiments with waivable workers’ rights.
For many problems, it would make sense to combine a system of nonwaivable statutory
minima, consisting of safeguards that no worker should lack, alongside an ample set of waivable
workers’ rights, subject to bargaining. There is room for disagreement about what should count
as the nonwaivable minima and what should count as the waivable workers’ rights; it is in
identifying the content of the categories, rather than in settling on the basic approach, that
reasonable disputes will arise. An approach of this kind is no blueprint, but it suggests a general
orientation that could provide the foundation for a new system of employment law in a wide
range of areas. Equally important, an understanding of the nature of workers’ judgments and
motivations, and the possible grounds for choosing among the legal options, could provide the
basis for orienting future inquiry, and for making progress on the issues, many of them empirical
in nature, that remain.
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